

JUN 15 1956

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A CONGRESSMAN LOOKS INSIDE THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Who really makes policy for U. S. in the foreign field? Is the Department of State always zealous in watching out for the interests of America?

Representative Walter H. Judd, Republican, of Minnesota, gives answers to those and other questions in testimony that follows.

His conclusion: U. S. foreign policy, in practice, often is made not at the top, but among officials down the line—frequently with motives that are obscure and with effects not in the U. S. interest.

Following are excerpts from the transcript of testimony by Representative Walter H. Judd before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, May 31, 1956:

Mr. Morris [Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Subcommittee]: Mr. Judd, do you remember making a visit to China in October, 1945?

Mr. Judd: Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris: I wonder if you would relate what happened at that time?

Mr. Judd: . . . I talked, of course, to our officials there. . . . The thing that disturbed me was the conversations I had with some of the junior members of our Embassy and some of the colonels—that general level in our military staff—because a surprising number of them were just following one line, that we must ditch the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek], his Government was hopeless, and we must back the Communists, because they were (1) democratic, (2) they were interested in the well-being of the people, (3) they would be more co-operative with us than the Generalissimo because the Generalissimo had been unwilling to—he had opposed General Stilwell's proposal to ship Lend-Lease material up to the Communists, and so on. [Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell was Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek.]

These people were all for arming the Communists, and all—these Americans—all for sort of making the Communists the main agency that we would back in China. I was sure that would be disastrous. I could not figure out why so many of our Americans would be just chanting what, to me, was the Communist Party line, and which later proved to be the Communist Party line.

Mr. Morris: Many of those are still in the United States Government today, are they not?

Mr. Judd: Some of them are, and some of them are not.

Then there were, from the military, colonels and majors who took the same position, and most of the members of the American press.

Walter Judd long has been recognized as an authority on the Far East and on workings of the Department of State. He is serving his seventh term in Congress. Previously, Representative Judd spent many years in China as a medical missionary.

On May 31 of this year, the Minnesota Congressman was called to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Under questioning, he recounted many of his observations of the State Department in action at home and abroad.

Mr. Morris: Generally, what were they doing?

Mr. Judd: . . . There was a universal line that America should ditch our ally, the Nationalist Government of China, and put our chips on the Communists. That disturbed me tremendously. . . .

* * *

Another thing—the leaks that come to the press. Here is one recently. All of you have seen in the press for six months repeated stories, especially from certain columnists, that the United States is going to recognize Communist China, and, after the next election, the United Nations Assembly will meet and admit Communist China to the United Nations. I asked about it two or three times down at the State Department, if this is true. It has been denied completely by everybody at the top.

Finally, one came out a few weeks ago in a *Kiplinger Letter*. It said that at one of these conferences it was tentatively agreed that this should be done. It would be denied officially, the *Letter* said, but the fact is the United States is going to recognize Communist China and not veto its entrance into the United Nations.

I called up key men and said, "Has there been a change?"

They said, "No; we saw it, too. There is not a word of truth in it."

Now, the newspapers didn't think that up. Somebody in the Department told them that. This is the thing that goes on again and again. Leaks go out from underlings that this is what our policy is going to be. Now, we are going to recognize Communist China.

That is not the President's policy. That is not Mr. Dulles's policy. That is not the policy of the Far East Division. Yet, somewhere down in the State Department or in the Pentagon, or the National Security Council, or somewhere, there are people who passed this out. You go to the press people and they won't reveal their sources. I don't blame them.

But this is handed to them as inside dope to pass out to their readers. This is the way in which they shift the think-

.. "Too much emphasis on cloak and dagger work" of Reds

ing of the people toward further appeasement of the Communists.

Mr. Morris: Are there other things the Committee should look for in trying to determine whether or not there are Communists or Communist sympathizers working in our midst?

Mr. Judd: Let me say this: I, myself, think in our country there has been a little too much emphasis on the cloak and dagger work of the Communists. We have to get somebody who stole documents or wrote something in code to the Soviet Union. I don't think those are the dangerous ones. Those are the little fellows.

The really dangerous ones are the ones nobody ever suspected. I remember John Peurifoy, when he was chairman of security, or head of security, in the Department in 1947 and 1948, and we had a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in the House that investigated the Department and we got rid of 131 unsuitable people, about half of whom were Communists or Communist suspects. We didn't have a headline. But he said to me one day:

"Walter, what worries me is how many there are like Hiss, whom I never suspected. I used to lunch with Hiss, once in a while. It makes me wonder if the fellow I have lunched with now is one."

If you go down through their history and watch what they recommend over the years, it turns out to be favorable to the Soviet Union. I am sure they will never be found to be carrying Communist cards. They would be fools to have meetings in the back end of an alley or a restaurant somewhere. They are clever, and their real danger is their ability to, at the lower echelons, write policy papers, position papers, which come up to their superiors and become policy papers.

Then those policy papers go to the action agencies, like

the State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council. If you allow me to write the papers on which my superiors make their decisions, I think I could have a good deal to say about what my superiors will think.

For example, if the top man comes in and he has the choice between two memoranda on his desk, and those both are written by a fellow who is pro-Communist, the man's freedom of decision is not too wide. He has to decide between two positions, both of which are in various degrees pro-Communist, which means, in my book, inimical to the interests of the United States.

Mr. Morris: Do you think, then, that committees such as the Internal Security Subcommittee should look into who has been writing for years the directives that make the policies?


Mr. Judd: I think that is where pay dirt is to be found, sir.

* * *

Now, here is a story that you can confirm: On the morning of April 13 [1945], when President Truman, the new President, came to his office in the White House for the first time as President of the United States, naturally the press was there from a great many papers and so on, and the picture taken of the new President, the first morning in his office, the first piece of business, shows a memorandum on the President's desk, written right on there. A man who has that picture now, who was in intelligence and was sensitive to intelligence, saw it and the minute he saw it, he said to his friends, President Truman, "You must not have a picture like that around, showing for all to read a memorandum on the President's desk, no matter whether it is innocuous or not."

What does the memorandum tab say? The first piece of business: "See John Carter Vincent about China."

Who is high enough in the Administration—within two



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
UNDER SCRUTINY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT

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... "I can't understand how the experts can be so misguided"

weeks after Roosevelt had reconfirmed the policy supporting the Government of China, helping the Generalissimo win, re-establish order in his country, build up and overcome the great difficulties which had existed—who is high enough to get the first piece of business for a new President, "Sec John Carter Vincent about China"? John Carter Vincent, whose policy, as he himself avowed, says, "I worked at nothing for years, except to get the coalition between the Communists and the National Government."

Well, Mr. Truman didn't have that background. Obviously, Mr. Vincent and the others got to him—I am not accusing them of Communism or anything of the sort. They, however, for whatever reason, believed we should back the



MR. JUDD TO COUNSEL MORRIS: "The damage is done in preparing directives"

Communists and try to get a coalition. I can't understand their ignorance, if that is what it was, because the documents are so replete.

In a report to my own Committee on Nov. 14, 1947, after I had been out on another trip to China and examined this thing, I discussed this here. Talking about the threefold plan that the Communists had, it is (1) to destroy the Generalissimo at home by tearing up the railroads, wrecking the economy, making it impossible to restore his economic processes, and so on; (2) to destroy him abroad by saying—they had six words for him: inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt, reactionary. By saying these six things, inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt, and reactionary, you can close off all mental processes.

The third thing was to build up the Communists themselves as democratic. I said, "The propaganda, as you know, was largely led by about 20 or 30 writers and lecturers and commentators in America, and by some men who became Far East advisers to our State Department or experts on the staffs of organizations supposedly dedicated to enlightening the American people on Asiatic affairs or foreign policy."

"There were some of the group in what has become widely known as the 'Red cell' in the State Department—the Far Eastern office. It has been openly said that some of these experts, both in and out of the Government, are members of the Communist Party, although I have no personal knowledge of that. But certainly, they have consistently followed the party line with respect to the Chinese Communists.

"One of them openly boasted that, while they had not succeeded in all they wanted, at least they had gotten rid of Grew, Hurley and Hornbeck, who were the three in State Department who knew the facts about the Communists' wiles, and who tried to carry out Roosevelt's policy of supporting the Central Government of China."

In the next page I said:

"I do not know when, if ever before in history, some 30 or 40 persons in and out of the Government have been able to lose a great victory so almost completely as this handful of Communists, fellow travelers and misguided liberals in America has succeeded in doing with respect to the victory over Japan which 4 million brave Americans won at such a cost in blood and sacrifice. I do not like to make so strong a statement, but I do not see how anyone can look at the facts and come to any other conclusion."

Impending Loss of China Was Clear

It was plain as day in the fall of 1947 that we were going to lose it [China] if we didn't change. But we didn't succeed in changing.

Mr. Morris: You mention that report. When did you make that report?

Mr. Judd: Nov. 14, 1947. . . .

I am just an ordinary workingman Congressmen. I could find out what the Communists were up to. I can't understand how the great experts can be so misguided and mislead. I cannot believe it is wholly ignorance.

Mr. Morris: You think we have the problem with us today?

Mr. Judd: Well, you see it on every hand. Look, here is last night's David Lawrence article. He is quoting from a speech by Allen Dulles of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], in which Mr. Dulles is warning about the dangers of some of our allies' going into coalition with Communists:

"Today the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Communists, even in Europe, is not to be ignored. In Asia, this threat is even greater, because it is generally less well understood."

Here is the head of our CIA warning us against coalitions with the Communists. Yet the State Department, with the exception of a few at the top, was insisting on coalition with the Communists then. There are some not only advocating, now, parliamentary coalition with the Communists, but executive branch—War Department compromises, if you will.

Mr. Morris: I think in executive session you went through four points we should look for. . . .

Mr. Judd: I said you ought to watch where Government officials put out false information, or, second, where they leak to the press information posed to be the inside dope on American policy, which is contrary to the announced and official policies of the responsible heads of our agencies in Government.

Third is their delay in carrying out directives—that is, policies established by the Congress, and, if they don't approve of it, feet are dragged and the goods don't get out or the action isn't put into effect.

... Pro-Communists still in Government? "Why, yes"

Chairman Eastland [Senator James O. Eastland (Dem.), of Mississippi]: Mr. Judd, where are those leaks coming from?

Mr. Judd: I don't know, sir. I have tried to find out from some of my newspaper friends. They come from State and from the Pentagon. Those are the two common sources.

Chairman Eastland: Then you think some of these people that are pro-Communist are still in the State Department, and still in the Pentagon?

Mr. Judd: Why, yes. I don't mean pro-Communists in the sense that they are still in the party, but they advocate policies that work out to the good of the party. On the law of averages, a moron once in a while would make a decision that would be favorable to the United States. When policies [that] are given or advocated to a group consistently work out to [Communist] advantage, that couldn't be happenstance.

Who Really Shapes Policy

Chairman Eastland: Do I understand that you think that the recommendations of these individuals have influence with the real policy makers in the State Department and in the Pentagon?

Mr. Judd: Oh, there is no slightest doubt of it. For example, if I may use an illustration, I am told, because I have asked all kinds of questions down there, that here is the Assistant Secretary for a given area, Europe or the Middle East or the Far East. He is strongly anti-Communist, and in every instance he takes a position to build up the interests of the United States. He is the man who carried out policies and so on. But we are inclined to assume that because he is the Assistant Secretary he is the man who advises the Secretary on what the policies should be. But, when you investigate, you find that isn't the way it happened. It is the planning council—whatever you call it.

Mr. Morris: Policy Planning Board, isn't it?

Mr. Judd: Policy Planning Board. They have on their Policy Planning Board a man, for example, for the Far East, one for Latin America, one for the Middle East, and so on. They prepare the "position" papers. Those are the ones that go up to the higher levels, where the policy is determined. The men we look to, the men you confirm as Assistant Secretaries, carry out the policies. But I find they are not the influential ones in making the policies. It is these position papers that come up from the Policy Planning Board.

Chairman Eastland: You think today that those officials are subject to pro-Communist influence?

Mr. Judd: You mean the higher officials?

Chairman Eastland: Yes.

Mr. Judd: Yes, I do. I don't see how they can come to the conclusions they do if that weren't the case.

Mr. Morris: You think, Congressman, that influencing our policy to our disadvantage would come from the bottom and not from the top?

Mr. Judd: Oh, I am sure it is not from the top. You talk to some of those people and they are distressed themselves at the miscarriage of the orders that are supposed to be against the Communists and it doesn't work out.

As John Peurifoy said, some of these people are not on our side. Who are the people?

Chairman Eastland: What is the trouble? Can't they fire them?

Mr. Judd: Well, it seems to me they could. It seems they could, if there was the will to be really tough in policing an organization and tightening it up. They could go back to the papers and find out what a man's position consistently has

been. Then, if he has been consistently advocating over the years a policy which events have proven wrong, he ought to be fired, not as a Communist, but as a fellow who is wrong.

If I have a doctor who takes care of my father and he dies, who takes care of my mother and she dies, who takes care of my wife and she dies, and then I get sick, I am going to fire him, not as a Communist, but because he is just not a good doctor.

I don't think we have to call them subversive. I think a lot of them are not subversive. They are intellectuals, and Communism appeals to the theoretical mind—one leads to two, two leads to three.

Chairman Eastland: But you do think they are pro-Communist?

Mr. Judd: I think the things they advocate consistently work out to the interest of the Communists.

Mr. Morris: Have you finished the four points?

Mr. Judd: The fourth one was in writing their directives. They start out with a big, smashing, strong statement, and then, in the third or fourth paragraph, it is hedged around with howevers and buts until it is watered down. Then it goes up, say, to the National Security Council or other boards who have to take this policy paper and work out a policy. They don't go by the big, strong statement. They go by the small print when it is spelled out in the later paragraphs.

So, the policy that is ultimately carried out is not the one that is foreshadowed, apparently, in the strong, anti-Communist, firm policy in the first paragraph. It is the one down in the modified paragraphs or in the rewriting of the directive, based on the policy which can be watered down.

I think it is in the preparing of these papers and directives that the damage is done, and in the influencing of minds of the people above.

Chairman Eastland: Let me ask you this question. Do you believe that any government ever had a weaker department than our present State Department?

Mr. Judd: No, I think the State Department is a good deal better than it was. But I still think it has a long way to go. I will probably get in trouble, but I have said this to him personally.

A man down in the Department said to me just about inauguration day in 1953:

"Well, we were kind of worried when there was a change down here, but we have things under control."

I said, "What do you mean?"

"Well, we are going to give Mr. Dulles the Jimmy Byrnes treatment."

"What is that?" I asked.

"Keep the Secretary of State out of the country."

He said, "Look at Jimmy Byrnes: He came in and we took Byrnes and [Senator Tom] Connally and [Senator Arthur] Vandenberg and sent them to Paris for six months. They were over there while the postwar pattern of appeasement was being established. They kept them out of the country."

This man was not one of them.

Appeasement: Still a Problem

Chairman Eastland: We still have that policy of appeasement, don't we?

Mr. Judd: I beg your pardon?

Chairman Eastland: As I understand your testimony, we still do have that pattern of appeasement.

Mr. Judd: In the lower echelons. Not at the top.

Chairman Eastland: But you say they influence the men at the top. They are being influenced by pro-Communists.

Mr. Judd: I think